Discussion in 'General Discussion' started by Anonymous, May 1, 2011.
Every dog comes his own day... lol
Al-Qaida's Watch of Choice: Wearing a Casio Enough to Become Terror Suspect - SPIEGEL ONLINE
^ Y'all STFU about my birth certificate.
I don't understand trigger discipline!
How about a classic: Y'all niggers be niggering with my niggers. Also, next year, can we vote for that guy who impersonates him on SNL?
Now, Donald, I'm gonna give you one more chance to STFU...
Osama bin Laden.
dun no sum guy wanna b famous
Please stop doxing yourself. How many people have your impressive CV ? Not many, IMHO.
Oh, and your PhD supervisor might not like the idea of you spending time on a site that support Wikileaks instead of finishing your thesis.
What's all this about Wikileaks? I thought the main focus was supposed to be Scientology.
Note that there's an entire forum for Wikileaks related posts.
Yeah but I think there was some treaty signed with the 9/11 truth idiots and various conspiracy nuts that required us to house a portion of their ilk here, and thus FoI was born. I know that's not the case, I just like to pretend it was because it's funnier that way
ZOMG there is. I never noticed. It's not like it's obvious there at all.
lol he might have...^
Osama bin Laden was stopped for speeding in car while on run in Pakistan, report reveals - Telegraph
By Rob Crilly, July 8, 2013
The hunt for Osama bin Laden might have ended eight years earlier had a Pakistani traffic policeman spotted the world’s most wanted man in a car he had stopped for speeding.
The extraordinary revelation is made by Pakistan’s official investigation, obtained last night by Al Jazeera, into how bin Laden managed to live undetected in the country for almost a decade.
In its report, the Abbottabad Commission concluded that Pakistan’s military and government missed numerous opportunities to close in on the world’s most wanted man.
They may have come closest when the al-Qaeda leader was living in the Swat Valley during 2002 and 2003.
According to the testimony of Maryam, the wife of Ibrahim al-Kuwaiti, on bin Laden’s two trusted bodyguards, they would make occasional visits to the local bazaar.
She told investigators that on one trip their car was pulled over for speeding by a policeman, but that her husband “quickly settled the matter”. Whether the police officer was paid off or simply failed to spot the notorious passenger is not explained.
Good thing they stopped him for speeding. He could have killed someone.
The guy dropped off my weed. I knew he was shady. Smelled of aeroplane fuel. I could have done something . . . . .
Osama bin Laden: Pakistan criticized over failure to capture al-Qaida chief | The Guardian
Official report into killing of al-Qaida chief criticizes both Pakistan and US, which it says 'acted like a criminal thug'
Leaked report lambasts Pakistan failures on bin Laden - AFP
Incompetence and negligence by Pakistan allowed Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to live in the country undetected for more than nine years, a leaked report says.
The report by a Pakistani judicial commission also reveals new details about the US raid that killed bin Laden and intriguing details about his life on the run, including that he wore a cowboy hat to evade detection by US satellites.
CIA spies tracked down bin Laden to the northwestern town of Abbottabad, where he was shot dead by US Navy SEALs on May 2, 2011 during the dramatic raid near Pakistan's military academy.
It was one of the most humiliating episodes in Pakistan's history and exposed the country to allegations of incompetence or collusion with Al-Qaeda to hide the world's most wanted man.
The government set up the judicial commission shortly after the raid to investigate after parliament demanded an independent enquiry.
It interviewed senior civilian and military officials and bin Laden's three widows before they were deported to Saudi Arabia. But its findings were kept secret until the Al-Jazeera news network published them on Monday.
"Culpable negligence and incompetence at almost all levels of government can more or less be conclusively established by the testimonies of witnesses," the report said.
The commission said it had found nothing to support allegations of complicity but neither could it rule out the possibility of "'plausibly deniable' support" from current or former officials.
The Killing of Osama bin Laden | Seymour M. Hersh
It’s been four years since a group of US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in a night raid on a high-walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The killing was the high point of Obama’s first term, and a major factor in his re-election. The White House still maintains that the mission was an all-American affair, and that the senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were not told of the raid in advance. This is false, as are many other elements of the Obama administration’s account. The White House’s story might have been written by Lewis Carroll: would bin Laden, target of a massive international manhunt, really decide that a resort town forty miles from Islamabad would be the safest place to live and command al-Qaida’s operations? He was hiding in the open. So America said.
The most blatant lie was that Pakistan’s two most senior military leaders – General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the army staff, and General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, director general of the ISI – were never informed of the US mission. This remains the White House position despite an array of reports that have raised questions, including one by Carlotta Gall in the New York Times Magazine of 19 March 2014. Gall, who spent 12 years as the Times correspondent in Afghanistan, wrote that she’d been told by a ‘Pakistani official’ that Pasha had known before the raid that bin Laden was in Abbottabad. The story was denied by US and Pakistani officials, and went no further. In his book Pakistan: Before and after Osama (2012), Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, a think tank in Islamabad, wrote that he’d spoken to four undercover intelligence officers who – reflecting a widely held local view – asserted that the Pakistani military must have had knowledge of the operation. The issue was raised again in February, when a retired general, Asad Durrani, who was head of the ISI in the early 1990s, told an al-Jazeera interviewer that it was ‘quite possible’ that the senior officers of the ISI did not know where bin Laden had been hiding, ‘but it was more probable that they did [know]. And the idea was that, at the right time, his location would be revealed. And the right time would have been when you can get the necessary quid pro quo – if you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.’
This spring I contacted Durrani and told him in detail what I had learned about the bin Laden assault from American sources: that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Kayani and Pasha knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters delivering the Seals to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of the administration’s account were false.
‘When your version comes out – if you do it – people in Pakistan will be tremendously grateful,’ Durrani told me. ‘For a long time people have stopped trusting what comes out about bin Laden from the official mouths. There will be some negative political comment and some anger, but people like to be told the truth, and what you’ve told me is essentially what I have heard from former colleagues who have been on a fact-finding mission since this episode.’ As a former ISI head, he said, he had been told shortly after the raid by ‘people in the “strategic community” who would know’ that there had been an informant who had alerted the US to bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, and that after his killing the US’s betrayed promises left Kayani and Pasha exposed.
The major US source for the account that follows is a retired senior intelligence official who was knowledgeable about the initial intelligence about bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. He also was privy to many aspects of the Seals’ training for the raid, and to the various after-action reports. Two other US sources, who had access to corroborating information, have been longtime consultants to the Special Operations Command. I also received information from inside Pakistan about widespread dismay among the senior ISI and military leadership – echoed later by Durrani – over Obama’s decision to go public immediately with news of bin Laden’s death. The White House did not respond to requests for comment.
Seymour Hersh Article Alleges Cover-Up in Bin Laden Hunt | New York Times
Four years after a Navy SEAL team killed Osama bin Laden in his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, lingering questions remain about the raid and what led up to it. Now, in a 10,000-word article in The London Review of Books, the journalist Seymour M. Hersh challenges nearly every facet of the semiofficial narrative that has emerged over the years, alleging a vast cover-up that involves hundreds, possibly thousands, of people and goes all the way to President Obama himself.
On Monday, the White House press secretary, Josh Earnest, said the article is “riddled with inaccuracies and outright falsehoods.”
The gist of Mr. Hersh’s report is that Pakistan harbored Bin Laden for years with money paid by Saudi Arabia. Once the United States found out the Pakistanis had Bin Laden, Mr. Hersh writes, it offered Pakistan’s generals a choice: Help the United States kill him or watch billions of dollars in American aid disappear. The Americans and the Pakistanis then worked together to plot the raid, Mr. Hersh writes.
In its bold claims, Mr. Hersh’s article, relying largely on anonymous sources, pairs plausible alternatives to the details about the raid presented by the administration with a number of much more questionable claims.
Were it not for the byline of Mr. Hersh, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who first gained notice more than 45 years ago for exposing the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, the story would likely have been readily dismissed and gained little attention.
In one conceivable episode, Mr. Hersh writes that American intelligence officials were alerted to Bin Laden’s whereabouts by a Pakistani military officer who walked into the United States Embassy in Islamabad and was subsequently paid a reward and moved by the C.I.A. to the United States. The account told by the Obama administration after the raid — that the C.I.A. tracked down Bin Laden through the work of dogged analysts — was a ruse intended to protect the real informant, according to Mr. Hersh.
It is a deception that the C.I.A. has employed before, claiming for years that it discovered that one of its own, Aldrich H. Ames, was passing intelligence to the Soviet Union through the work of a team of analysts. The truth that eventually emerged was that crucial evidence against Mr. Ames came from a Soviet spy working for the C.I.A.
Yet other claims by Mr. Hersh would have required a cover-up extending from top American, Pakistani and Saudi officials down to midlevel bureaucrats.
One example is Mr. Hersh’s claim, based on anonymous sources, that administration officials were lying when they said the SEAL team recovered a trove of intelligence from Bin Laden’s compound.
If he is right, that means the United States knowingly allowed an F.B.I. agent to perjure himself at a federal trial of a member of Al Qaeda in New York in February. In his testimony, the agent described in detail how he received computers, hard drives, documents and other material from the SEAL team members immediately after they landed at a base in Afghanistan. He then spent 17 hours cataloging the material before it was put on a plane back to the United States.
The detail, if manufactured, is stunning: The agent, Alexander Otte, listed the types of materials he had received, including the size of some of the digital storage devices recovered (a two-gigabyte micro-SD card, a four-gigabyte thumb drive), and even the brands of the devices (Sony and Kingston).
Mr. Otte also testified that he saw the body of Bin Laden, which Mr. Hersh reported had been largely dismembered by gunfire during the raid. The SEAL team members then threw some body parts out of the helicopters on the way back to Afghanistan, Mr. Hersh writes, though he did report that Bin Laden’s head was largely intact.
Mr. Otte, in his testimony, offered a very different account: Asked if the SEAL team members had a body with them, he said, “It was the body of Osama bin Laden.” At no point did he describe the body as being in pieces or having been decapitated.
Mr. Hersh is standing by his article. In a brief telephone interview on Monday, he said, “You can have your skepticism.”
Pakistanis Knew Where Osama Bin Laden Was, U.S. Sources Say | NBC News
Two intelligence sources tell NBC News that the year before the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, a "walk in" asset from Pakistani intelligence told the CIA where the most wanted man in the world was hiding - and these two sources plus a third say that the Pakistani government knew where bin Laden was hiding all along.
The U.S. government has always characterized the heroic raid by Seal Team Six that killed bin Laden as a unilateral U.S. operation, and has maintained that the CIA found him by tracking couriers to his walled complex in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
The new revelations do not necessarily cast doubt on the overall narrative that the White House began circulating within hours of the May 2011 operation. The official story about how bin Laden was found was constructed in a way that protected the identity and existence of the asset, who also knew who inside the Pakistani government was aware of the Pakistani intelligence agency's operation to hide bin Laden, according to a special operations officer with prior knowledge of the bin Laden mission. The official story focused on a long hunt for bin Laden's presumed courier, Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.
While NBC News has long been pursuing leads about a "walk in" and about what Pakistani intelligence knew, both assertions were made public in a London Review of Books article by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh. Hersh's story, published over the weekend, raises numerous questions about the White House account of the SEAL operation. It has been strongly disputed both on and off the record by the Obama administration and current and former national security officials.
The Hersh story says that the "walk in," a Pakistani intelligence official, contacted U.S. authorities in 2010, that elements of ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency, knew of bin Laden's whereabouts, and that the U.S. told the Pakistanis about the bin Laden raid before it launched. The U.S. has maintained that it did not tell the Pakistani government about the raid before it launched.
On Monday, Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve Warren called Hersh's piece "largely a fabrication" and said there were "too many inaccuracies" to detail each one. Col Warren said the raid to kill bin Laden was a "unilateral action." Both the National Security Council and the Pentagon denied that Pakistan had played any role in the raid.
Full article and video:
Seymour Hersh interview: On his Bin Laden story, the New Yorker, journalism, and his own bad mood
By Isaac Chotiner, Slate, May 13, 2015
In a blockbuster 10,000-word story for the London Review of Books this week, longtime New Yorker investigative journalist Seymour Hersh called into question the official account of the American raid that killed Osama Bin Laden, and argued that what is arguably seen as the apex of Barack Obama’s presidency is actually built on a lie.
Hersh’s piece claims that Bin Laden was being held prisoner by the Pakistani military and intelligence service (the ISI), who were using him as a means to control Taliban and al-Qaida elements, and hoping to use him as leverage in their relationship with the United States. According to Hersh, who relied largely on an anonymous intelligence source, the Obama administration found out that Pakistan had Bin Laden, and eventually convinced Pakistani military leaders to allow a raid on the compound where Bin Laden was being held. The plan, Hersh writes, was to say publicly that Bin Laden was killed not in the raid but in a drone strike. The White House, however, supposedly broke this deal because of the political value of making the details of the raid public.
Hersh’s story has been much debated over the past several days, with many calling it into question and (a comparable few) others applauding its willingness to undercut the official narrative. NBC News and the AFP have both backed up small elements of Hersh’s story, although both outlets have also called other elements of his piece into question (and NBC later backed away from its original reporting). And no news source has supported Hersh’s largest claim — that the president lied about the raid.
I spoke to Hersh by phone this week. Here is a transcript of our conversation, which has been slightly condensed and edited for clarity.
Snowden Files Give New Details on Osama bin Laden Raid
By Cora Currier, Andrew Fishman, and Margot Williams, The Intercept
Secret intelligence documents disclosed by Edward Snowden provide new context for evaluating the various accounts of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.
The U.S. has long maintained that the raid was conducted without the knowledge of the Pakistani government, and that the critical intelligence that led to bin Laden’s location came from a years-long effort by U.S. analysts and operatives to trace the path of an Al Qaeda courier.
A new report by veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, published last week in the London Review of Books, calls that story a lie.
Hersh reports that bin Laden had been in Pakistani custody since 2006, and the tip-off to his location came from a former Pakistani intelligence official in August 2010. Senior Pakistani military officers knew of the U.S. raid ahead of time, and the courier story was created to cover the role of the Pakistani informant, Hersh alleges; his account relies on a former U.S. intelligence official, two Special Operations Command consultants, and mostly unnamed sources within Pakistan. While the White House has vehemently denied Hersh’s account, other reports have supported the existence of a Pakistani walk-in informant.
The Intercept is publishing a number of documents from the Snowden archive related to the Abbottabad raid and the hunt for bin Laden, which neither explicitly prove nor disprove any aspect of Hersh’s account. However, the documents reference a number of things that are relevant to the debate, including the tracking of Al Qaeda couriers in Pakistan and the existence of intelligence gathered from the Abbottabad compound, as well as the impact of the raid on U.S.-Pakistani counterterrorism partnerships.
The files provided by Snowden by no means represent the totality of intelligence community documents from that time period. The archive, sourced from the NSA’s computer systems, offers only a partial window into the intelligence community’s CIA-led efforts to find bin Laden.
The documents The Intercept identified that are related to bin Laden offer few specific details, and often use boastful language designed to justify budgets and boost career accomplishments.
Moreover, given how vast the intelligence community is — and its compartmentalization and secrecy — its members may be unaware of what other agencies, or even units within their own agency, are doing.
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