‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

iConference 2011 Program

Thursday, February 10
2:00 PM – 3:30 PM
Session 29: Social Media
'The Internet is Here’: Emergent Coordination and Innovation of Protest Forms in Digital Culture, Patrick Underwood, Howard Welser

http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~welser/Underwood.Welser.2011.pdf

‘The Internet is Here’: Emergent Coordination and Innovation of Protest Forms in Digital Culture

Patrick Underwood
Department of Sociology
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98105
patriu@u.washington.edu

Howard T. Welser
Department of Sociology
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio 45701
welser@ohio.edu

The series of protests against the Church of Scientology known as “Project Chanology” marks the emergence of an important form of contemporary protest movement defined by networked internal structures and pervasive memetic culture. Such a protest movement is highly dynamic- rapidly adapting to changing challenges and contextual settings. This cultural innovation is made possible by the increasing digital mediation of social life. In the following analysis, we trace the unique structural contours of Chanology, investigate how participants leveraged a unique internal structure and the memetic environment of the internet to grow, and conclude with an explanation of why the novel modes of protest used in Chanology contributed to its success and why these forms of protest are likely to proliferate in an increasingly digitally mediated environment. From a theoretical standpoint, Project Chanology both affirms and challenges conventional conceptions of social movements. The utility of Chwe’s network analytical approach to the problems of coordination in social movements is also demonstrated.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
A.0 [General Literature]: General – Conference proceedings.

General Terms
Human Factors, Theory.

Keywords
Culture, social movements, protest, memes, Chanology, networked activism.

1. INTRODUCTION

On February 10th 2008, approximately 10,000 individuals from the loosely affiliated online collective known as Anonymous gathered in cities around the world to engage in coordinated protests against the Church of Scientology. These protests delivered a mixture of serious accusations of fraud and human rights abuses at the hands of the Church within a playful, carnivalesque, and at times obscure atmosphere. What was perhaps most remarkable about these protests was that they were carried out by a decentralized group with no formal leadership or internal organizational structures.

The following analysis draws upon qualitative and quantitative observations of public sites on which participants involved in Project Chanology interacted. We begin with an examination of the defining cultural and structural characteristics of Project Chanology, paying close attention to the ways in which the group leveraged online communications technologies and its memetic culture. Next, we move to an examination of why Project Chanology was initially successful and how it was able to expand by drawing in new participants. We draw upon a theory of emergent cultural coordination in low density networks [12] to aid in an explanation of how the structure of Chanology was of great utility in rapid coordination of group action. Finally, we explore how the novel aspects of Chanology contributed to its success and demonstrate the utility of these new forms of protest in contemporary social movement activism.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Social Interaction in a Connected Age

Online and off, social groups are changing [4], [31], [34], [35]. The things that we do today, how we do them, and with whom have shifted in recent years. Just five years ago it was rare to post messages or images from a cell phone. Now, hand held social computing is nearly ubiquitous and being connected is the default condition for young adults [29]. The more that people interact online, the more that our communities, our culture, our groups and our identities are shaped by dynamics of computer mediated interaction. As modes of social interaction (Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, etc.) become increasingly rich it becomes easier for online culture to bleed into what William Gibson dubbed the “meatspace”, and for events from the “meatspace” to reverberate back into the computer mediated world.

Clay Shirky remarked that technology becomes socially interesting when it becomes technologically boring [34]. He meant that when computer mediated interaction becomes common enough, that it changes the inherent “friction” that prevents people from doing things together [41]. We interact differently online than we do in face to face life. Like industrialization moving people from small towns to the metropolis [36], online interaction changes the structure of interaction. If your interests make you one in thousand, you are isolated in your home town, but there are tens of thousands of like-minded folks online. This is the long tail [1] of the social distribution, and it changes our potential to do things together [34].

2.2 Social Movements

Social movements are a basic foundation of contemporary democratic societies [26], [40]. They provide outlets for political positions to be voiced, for powerful actors to be critiqued, and for grievances to be aired [28]. Although people participate in movements for many reasons, a crucial foundation is identity commitment, or people’s capacity to see the values and practices embodied in social movement organizations as fundamental to their definition of self [28], [37]. Project Chanology represents in interesting instance in which identity commitment appears to be centered on having fun and the image of the self as trickster.

Social movements employ a host of strategies, techniques, and tactical repertoires [39], [40]. At any given point, a movement has a repertoire of protest forms at its disposal, and will employ some organic set of strategies from those apparent to movement participants [38]. This is true of social movements using online technologies as well [33]. Throughout history, social movements have adopted strategies demonstrated by earlier movements and have innovated new strategies to confront new challenges, types of opponents, or novel situations [27], [40].

2.3 Computer Mediated Interaction, Memes and Innovation of New Forms of Social Protest

The rise of new participatory types of computer mediated interaction (CMI) increases peoples’ capacity to organize in social movements. Ubiquitous CMI also changes the structure of interaction between the social movement participants and others. The audience for movement participants is larger and more diverse when anyone can post a video to YouTube, comment on a blog, or recommend a link to a social new aggregation site like Reddit or Digg. Given the right set of images or situation, the next internet meme can come from anywhere, and when cultural objects “go viral” they change the terrain of those involved, and can alter the opportunity structure for future events.

Memes [16] are distinctive cultural objects that are transmitted through communication, and spread through a population of social actors in a manner analogous to the spread of viruses through a population of organisms. Online, the term meme is also used to describe inside jokes and clichés employed in online communities like 4chan, Digg, Icanhazcheezeburger, etc. Finally, the diffusion of innovations through interpersonal communication has long been a subject of social scientific research, and especially in the context of social movements. Social movements require tactics and modes of protest, and these movement options themselves are subject to dynamics of innovation and diffusion. All three conceptualizations of how ideas spread become relevant to the social movement dynamics of Chanology.

Ron Burt notes that many examples of “innovation” involve brokering, or actions that bridge between otherwise unconnected communities [10], [11]. Because culture is growing so rapidly, and in such complexly interconnected directions, we should expect that culture, in terms of practices, values, and sensibilities that emerge in one context, may well be carried into new social terrain. The case of Chanology illustrates how culture, internet memes, and the social role of the internet troll led to the innovation of new forms of social protest. An analysis of Chanology extends our growing awareness and understanding of new modes of social interaction emerging alongside the increasing proliferation of online communications technologies.

3. DATA

For the present analysis, we draw upon two primary sources of data. The first is comprised of empirical observation of the public, online sources used by members of Anonymous to plan, discuss, coordinate, and execute Project Chanology. When making these observations we focused less on discussion of Scientology and more upon how the participants saw themselves and the various rhetorical strategies employed to sustain group interaction and to build consensus. The second source of data is drawn from a quantitative analysis of interactions amongst Project Chanology participants at a wiki site. We constructed a network representing communication amongst individuals and also built measures of integration within the broader community at the site, which was used for more than just Chanology. While the data are not perfect and do not permit a view of the totality of Project Chanology taken together, they permit an examination of group structure as well as the myriad cultural, contextual factors that shaped Project Chanology.

4. ANALYSIS

4.1 Part 1: Structural and Cultural Features

4.1.1 Decentralization

Interaction amongst members of Anonymous participating in Project Chanology was of a highly decentralized and networked quality. Within the group, we did not find evidence of official leadership positions or formal organizational structures. In fact we commonly observed strong hostility towards those attempting to single handedly guide the actions of other participants. Such individuals were commonly derisively referred to as “leaderfags.” Over time, a geographically-based cell structure developed and duties within cells were assumed in an ad-hoc, volunteer based manner. In one instance that typified the assumption of such duties we noted an individual that claimed to work in the field of graphic design offering his or her expertise in designing graphics for protest signs. In another instance one participant, referring to the need for bringing water to a protest stated “Well soemone (sic) has to do it, might as well be me.” Decisions impacting Chanology as a whole were primarily made through consensus
building and collaborative interaction at specific websites and IRC channels. This collaborative structure allowed the group to work rapidly and democratically. This also made the overall group more resilient against the effects of individuals leaving and ensured that there were no easy or obvious targets for retaliation from Scientology. Finally, this structure encouraged the development of highly dynamic and emergent strategies as many individuals with varying ideas and talents were able to work simultaneously on a given project. Many explicitly recognized this advantage. One forum had a subsection dedicated to individuals listing skills and talents which might be of use.

4.1.2 The Centrality of Humor and Memes

One of the most distinctive aspects of Project Chanology was the pervasiveness and importance of humor and memetic knowledge for maintaining group solidarity and enabling novel performative protest actions. Participants reveled in public displays that would most likely appear bizarre and absurd to outsiders. One of the most frequent categories of observation we made was the use of memes and inside jokes from online communities such as 4chan and Something Awful in public protest displays. These displays were enactments of insider knowledge that served the dual purpose of creating a sense of shared identity amongst the protesters as well as producing a joyful sense of glee at being “in on the joke.” We argue that on a broader level, the esoteric cultural knowledge and humor of the group was an essential resource which served several vital functions including the maintenance of group identity, the creation and enforcement of group boundaries, and the provision of archetypes towards which the group as a whole could orient itself. As we discuss below, the use of humor and memetic information enabled Project Chanology to stand out from well-established modes of protest, aiding in recruiting more members and drawing media coverage. When viewed from this perspective, one can see how online, memetic culture can drive novel forms of social action when brought into the offline realm.

4.1.3 Flexible Group Structures

Anonymous’ possession of a group identity situated almost entirely within online spaces is certainly not unprecedented and there exist many online groups with stronger collective identities [2]. What makes Anonymous unique and notable is the ability of the group to maintain a stable collective identity despite the near total lack of broad connections to other group members and the absence of personal identity markers, both of which had previously been identified as essential for the development of such stability [7], [20]. While Anonymous was able to function as a cohesive group when needed (such as during globally coordinated protests) our research indicated that the group was always highly nebulous and participants themselves often balked at the notion of Anonymous being a traditional group. Often in forums we observed one participant remarking to another, when speaking about Anonymous, “who is this ‘we?’” The ability of Anonymous to function as a cohesive group without many connections amongst group members meant that they could engage in large scale coordinated behavior made possible by a strongly interconnected group while still retaining the tactical advantages brought by a highly decentralized network of group members whose identities were largely unknown to one another. This later advantage proved to be particularly useful against the Church of Scientology which had historically sought to stifle criticism by identifying critics and engaging them in costly legal battles [1]. The online communications technologies utilized by Anonymous allowed for the easy concealment of identity while still permitting active discussion and collaboration among large volumes of participants. This allowed the group to remain well coordinated without needing the emergence of a dense network of personal ties amongst members. This organizational structure within Project Chanology both confirms and challenges Tilly’s [40] highly influential predictions of future social movement development. Tilly sees internationalization (the tendency for social movements to cross borders in terms of participants and targets), and professionalization (the tendency of social movement organizations to become increasingly bureaucratic) as the likely future of the social movement. Tilly argues that internationalization arises as a response to increasingly transnational elite interests and power structures and that professionalization in turn arises to enable efficient coordination of increasingly large and geographically dispersed movements. The success of Project Chanology however suggests that, with the rise of online technologies permitting large scale, rapid, global communications, professionalization may not be an inevitable consequence of internationalization. While Chanology (which included members from around the globe as well as a multinational target in Scientology) clearly follows the predicted path of internationalization, we did not observe the emergence of the formal, bureaucratic organizational structures which would signify professionalization. Thus, the adoption of online communications technologies by social movement groups may require the reconsideration of some traditional assumptions aboutsocial movements.

4.1.4 From Online to Offline

In the past, activist groups have been noted for integrating online technologies into their existing repertories [27], [33]. Yet Project Chanology marks arguably the first successful instance of a social movement originating entirely within an online space and subsequently adopting offline tactics and actions. The online culture of Anonymous factored heavily in this transition. In the course of our observations, we noted that many members of Anonymous framed the proposition of offline action as an extension of the online cultural milieu of the group into the offline realm. Subsequent analysis of the protests indicated that Anonymous drew heavily upon their existing online culture in constructing their street demonstrations. For example we noted the high value placed upon trolling within the culture of Anonymous, and many of the protest actions of the group appeared to have been grafted upon this cognitive scaffolding. One of the most commonly observed instances of this was participants referring to their protests as “raids,” which was the same label that Anonymous had previously used for attacks against online targets. Reflecting this ethos, one participant urged others to join in by saying “If we can destroy Scientology, we can destroy whatever we like. The world will be but our plaything.”

Many of the memes familiar to members of Anonymous aided in their transition to offline protest by providing readily available conceptual mappings of adversarial action. One of the unique aspects of memes is their ability to rapidly proliferate and adapt to new contextual environments. As a result, Anonymous was able to rapidly adapt to the new structural and contextual settings which offline action brought. The group rapidly mutated its culture to fit these new settings. These mutated memes were reintroduced into the online setting, gradually altering aspects of the original cultural setting from which they emerged. This bidirectional flow of memetic cultural information and mutation enabled Anonymous to rapidly adapt to new settings and situations, which was of high tactical value. In this way, Project Chanology represents the powerful flexibility of a social movement built upon a largely memetic culture.

4.1.5 Use of Culture and Insider Status

Given the lack of official membership rolls or stable identities, members of Anonymous had to rely almost entirely upon cultural displays to establish insider status and thereby construct and maintain stable group boundaries. Perrotta [25] notes similar boundary construction in his analysis of an online forum for psychologists. Drawing upon Bourdieu, Perrotta argues that the accumulation and deployment of cultural capital were the primary means by which members of the forums were able to signal insider status to one another. This same mechanism was used to create out groups (those without sufficient access to salient cultural capital in the form of technical psychological knowledge) and to deny entry to members of those out groups [25]. Thus even though the forums were public, and formally allowed anyone to join, the community members effectively created a means of identifying insiders and establishing a barrier for entry to the community.
Perrotta’s work provides a useful theoretical foundation for understanding the maintenance of group boundaries within Anonymous. Drawing upon our observational data, we conceptually frame the identification of insider status as a process whereby members of the group amass and deploy cultural capital in the form of knowledge and skillful manipulation of the cultural code of Anonymous. We commonly observed individuals presenting various cues to one another. In one typical exchange a suspicious user asked another if he would like a link to “some CP [child pornography].” The other user affirmed his or her insider knowledge by answering “no thanks, I’m not a sick fuck.” Those presented with these cues were able to signal their status as legitimate group members by replying in a specific manner that affirmed their knowledge of the culture of the group. Group identity was continuously affirmed and reaffirmed at the site of interaction amongst members of Anonymous. The centrality of skillful use of cultural capital also provided a cost of entry for newcomers. In order to be accepted as legitimate insiders, those new to Project Chanology had to spend time observing and learning the culture of Anonymous. Those asking questions were often greeted with cries of “lurk more,” a phrase which refers to remaining in the background and observing without actively participating. In essence it is a demand to learn more about the group and its actions before participating. It appears that this cost of entry also helped to strengthen bonds between insiders by enabling a shared sense of possession of somewhat rarefied cultural knowledge.

Beyond its use in establishing group boundaries, the esoteric culture of Anonymous was essentially the only source of solidarity within the group. Due to the norms of anonymity, affiliation based upon shared personal characteristics was essentially impossible and there was no well-defined grand purpose of Anonymous around which group members could unite. Knowledge of the group’s culture was experienced by group members as the key division between insiders and outsiders, and this shared status served to bond the group. By orienting their protests towards enactment of this culture, members of Anonymous participating in Chanology both reaffirmed their shared identity and signaled to other members of Anonymous that Chanology was something which fit within the normative boundaries of the broader collective. Furthermore, the ability to enact tongue in cheek displays of culture unintelligible to nongroup members served as a source of entertainment , which appeared to be a key incentive for those participating in the protests.

4.2 Part 2: From Structure to Outcomes- How Chanology Grew and Developed

4.2.1 Effective Marketing

The rich body of mimetic information available to Anonymous, as well as the online cultural milieu from which they emerged, both factored heavily in the manner in which Anonymous “marketed” Chanology to outsiders. While gaining mainstream media exposure appeared to be one goal of the protests, Anonymous effectively deployed newer social media early on to spread knowledge of Chanology virally. The primary “vector” for information about Chanology was a YouTube video which, at the time of this writing has received over four million views. Based upon early discussions of the video amongst Chanology participants, it appears that the video was intentionally crafted to be somewhat cryptic and dissonant and played heavily upon imagery of a massive, faceless collective rising up to strike down a deceitful totalitarian organization. In the weeks leading up to the February 10th protests, this video (essentially a meme) rapidly spread out along existing networks of individuals and online communities, “infecting” those communities with information about Scientology and Project Chanology, framed in a manner desired by Anonymous. Those infected communities then sent out the video to other communities, repeating the process. This ability to successfully reach out to a broad audience of potential participants without access to mainstream media demonstrates the powerful potential of emerging online technologies, particularly social media, for disempowered groups seeking to garner wider sympathy or support.

4.2.2 Standing Out from the Crowd, or Doing the Right Thing for Fun

If social media served as the vectors of Project Chanology, then the playful, Dadaesque atmosphere pervading Chanology was the viral payload. In their efforts to convince others to participate in the protests, the Chanologists stressed that while they were doing something important in lashing out at a group (Scientology) which had sought to impede the free flow of information on the internet, above all else the goal was to have fun. One poster, typifying this attitude stated that “hardcore anon can have their [fun]...society tanks the cult. Everyone wins!” In addition to the obvious incentives offered by assurances of entertainment, the novelty of a social movement driven primarily by pleasure seeking possessed its own allure. We often observed individuals explicitly stating that they were drawn to Project Chanology mainly because the protesters they saw seemed to be having so much fun. Members often joked that Project Chanology was a “social club for nerds.” We also observed individuals stating that they had never thought of themselves as prototypical social movement participants, but that the radically playful nature of Chanology was something with which they were immediately at ease.

By presenting Chanology as a movement about making a difference through having fun, Anonymous was also able to set the protests apart from “typical” street demonstrations. The playfully absurd demonstrations of Chanology presented a spectacle which drew attention and interest from passers by, facilitating the ability of Anonymous to spread their message and to recruit potential participants. We observed many individuals noting that they became a part of Chanology after having their curiosity piqued by a protest that they stumbled upon. Significantly, the unusual spectacle of the protests combined with the overall surreal nature of an online collective arising to take on an obscure, controversial religion made for an attractive story for mainstream news outlets [4], [5], [13]. The media coverage which Chanology received allowed Anonymous to reach out to entirely new audiences of potential sympathizers and recruits. By combining well established and more novel modes of protest Anonymous was able to receive support both from those motivated by outrage at the Church of Scientology as well as from those interested in the carnivalesque atmosphere of the protests.

4.2.3 Rapid Coordination

Chwe’s [12] modeling of network based diffusion of participation in social movements helps explain how Project Chanology was able to rapidly coordinate activity. Chwe uses graph theory and game theory to model the process by which individuals coordinate their actions in the form of deciding to participate in protest. Specifically, Chwe uses awareness of participation of a sufficiently large enough number of individuals as the threshold which must be met for an individual within the network to participate. Because individuals in his models receive information from nodes to which they are directly connected, thresholds were met when large portions of a given individual’s clique indicated willingness to participate. As a result, networks comprised of large numbers of smaller cliques had lower overall activation thresholds than networks with high degrees of connection amongst all members. Chwe argues that these “low density” networks are much better suited to rapid coordination than are “high density” networks because the smaller size of the cliques in which individuals are embedded allow for much quicker activation of individual nodes. As more and more cliques activate, participation becomes increasingly likely across the network as the overall level of participation rises. In essence, this process of activation is highly efficient in overcoming the “inertia” of hesitance to participate when overall commitment is initially low. This efficiency means that early adopters of action within a movement can rapidly mobilize later adopters within their respective cliques [12].

Our observations of Project Chanology suggest that the overall structure of the group, particularly during the initial phases of the movement, fits well Chwe’s description of a low density network. Recall that beginning immediately prior to the February 10th protests, a geographically based cell structure developed within Chanology. Connections between individuals within cells were denser than connections between cells, leading to a network characterized by high cliquishness. Figure 1 displays a hypothetical diagram of this structure with three different cells and a central hub site. This structure is highly similar to that of Chwe’s models. In this hypothetical example, individuals within the three cells connected to the central hub relay proposed action to the other members in their respective cells. Because the threshold of participation is bound to level of support within each cell and not the entire network, individual cells can rapidly reach consensus and agree or propose changes. In this manner, large
volumes of participants can coordinate their actions even in the absence of an official bureaucratic leadership structure which can rapidly coordinate through official authority within the group.

Figure 1. Representation of Cell Based Structure in Chanology

Our observations of an overall low level of direct coordination amongst participants in Chanology are partially supported by an analysis of activity at a wiki site which served as one of several initial hubs for Project Chanology. An analysis of the network of members at the site who participated in Chanology related activities revealed a very high degree of autonomy and extremely low level of connectedness among the most active members. Furthermore we found that, in comparison to the broader community in which they were situated, those most active in Project Chanology tended to be the most isolated.

In the model below, we represent the overall level of connectedness to others as in-degree. Those with higher in-degree are directly tied to larger numbers of individuals. Here, this signifies communication with a larger number of individuals. We generated a list of ties amongst community members via the messages left on one another’s user talk pages. The primary purpose of these talk pages was communication and so we consider user A leaving a message on the user talk page of user B to be an edge connecting user A to user B in the network. Indegree closeness centrality measures how many connections between individuals pass through a given group member. It measures the degree to which an individual may facilitate the transfer of information throughout the network. We included the clustering coefficient, a measure of completeness, as a control variable to account for possible shared variance with in-degree. Our community involvement variables are based upon the assumption that individuals who are more motivated to maintain an image in the community and those who actively participate more in the community are more invested in that community.

The data collection site uses Wiki software where contributors participate by editing pages. The two Community Involvement variables are total user page edit volume and total article edits. The first measures the effort a user puts into maintaining his or her profile page within the community and the second variable measures overall participation within the community. The dependent variable is the proportion of activity a user dedicated to Chanology.

As the results of our analysis in Table 1 show, network centrality (operationalized as in degree) and involvement within the broader community were both significantly negatively related to our measure of Chanology activity. As this data reflects only one interactional site within Chanology, it does not allow us to make conclusive statements regarding the entirety of the movement. However this data is consistent with our other observations and, coupled with the broader cell like structure we found, suggest that the overall structure of Chanology is amenable to Chwe’s analyses.

Just as in Chwe’s models, the decision of individuals to participate in a given course of action within Chanology was highly contingent upon knowledge that others would engage in the same action. The fear of embarrassment and vulnerability to retaliation from the Church which small numbers entailed was commonly cited as a primary reason for hesitance to engage in the protests. In addition, the reliance upon consensus building for large scale action meant that rapid coordination amongst members of Chanology was necessary for rapid action.

At first glance it would appear that the overall low level of integration within Chanology would be a severe impediment to the rapid coordination needed. However when applying Chwe’s work to Chanology we see that this structure was arguably conducive to rapid coordination. Consider the following scenario which typified coordination within Chanology. A proposal for a theme for upcoming protests is made at a hub site. Several individuals from different cells see this proposal and relay it to those within their respective cells. Individuals within cells turn to those to whom they are immediately connected to gauge the level of support for the proposed action. Once a sufficient proportion of cell members become early adopters and endorse the proposed action, other members within the cells agree to participate as well. These cells indicate their acceptance of the proposal through the hub or through direct connections to other cell members.

As the overall level of support for adoption grows, individuals within other cells are more likely to become early adopters and endorse the action, leading to other individuals within those respective cells endorsing the action as well. This process is selfreinforcing and accelerates as more and more cells agree to the action. As this example demonstrates, a decentralized cell like structure like the one observed in Chanology can maximize the spread of agreement to participate in a given action and, in doing so, permit extremely rapid coordination. Thus Chwe’s work provides a useful framework in which to locate the coordination activities of Project Chanology and our work provides limited empirical confirmation of Chwe’s theoretical models.

4.3 Part 3: Tactical Innovation and Diffusion

4.3.1 Cultural Origins

As mentioned previously, Project Chanology was largely structured around the idea of “offline trolling.” This was in large part a result of the participants’ online pedigree and heritage. Early participants in project Chanology were intensely involved in online communities hosted at 4chan. Amongst other functions, this site was both the source of many internet memes, and a figurative trophy case for 4channers who prided themselves on their capacity and success at trolling, intimidating, and harassing others. Though hardly a noble qualification, 4channers, and by extension Chanologists, were battle hardened veterans of online warfare and masters of the dark art of trolling. Like gangsters turned cops, those participating in Chanology harnessed that creativity and knowledge, channeling it into a successful movement strategy.

4channers are fond of the tongue in cheek catch phrase “the internet is serious business,” which is an ironic expression of the ethos that the internet is a realm in which nothing is sacred and those who are emotionally invested make themselves deserving targets of ridicule. In other words, for the trolls of 4chan instrumental rationality is for the uninitiated - ludic rationality is king. In Scientology, Chanologists had found an organization which behaved, in their eyes, according to the abusive, aggressive, antagonistic methods of trolling. Being experts in that type of behavior themselves, the Chanologists knew that it is not just futile, but counter-productive to meet strength with strength. Instead, the Chanologists organized to out-flank the standard Scientology counter-attack of seeking to label themselves victims of anti-religious discrimination. While the Church issued statements accusing Chanologists of being bigots and terrorists, the Chanologists served cake, danced to silly pop tunes, and carried nonsensical signs. By simultaneously playing the human rights card, free speech card, and their favorite card, the joker, Chanologists were able to effectively undermine and evade the Church’s response to their protests.

4.3.2 I’d Like to Teach the World to Troll…

Figure 2 depicts an iconic image produced by a member of Anonymous which represents both the intangible “essence” of Chanlology’s success (it is fun, hard to demonize, and effective at undermining the target) and why this style of protest has successfully spread. The image is filled with both serious accusations against the Church along with obscure references which invite insiders to laugh and pique the curiosity of outsiders. The statement, “the internet is here” also perfectly encapsulates the light hearted view held by many movement participants of Chanology representing the Internet as a singular entity manifested in the “real” world. The image is fun, interesting, and becomes a meme itself as it propagates throughout a digital environment marked by the sharing and remixing of culture. A simple Google image search reveals that this one image has been posted to dozens of blogs and other pages. Images like Figure 2 serve to define an approach to protest while helping to spread awareness of that protest form. The Dadaist mimetic protest form has been increasingly adopted by counter protesters to infamous hate groups, like the Fred Phelps led “Westboro Baptist church.” Phelps’ group essentially trolls funerals of soldiers with inflammatory signs and statements, with the goal of goading attendees into anger or violent outbursts as well as drawing attention to their demonstrations.

Figure 2. An Exemplary Project Chanology Image

Chanology influenced counter protests to Phelps’ group have included non-sense signs like “I HAVE A SIGN,” or “God hates flags!” rendering the hateful rhetoric of the Westboro Church as an object of mockery and derision and unworthy of any manner of consideration. Images, like those generated by counter protesters at ComicCon 2010 serve to further spread the meme of the Dadaist mimetic protest, fanned on the flames of online communities and a culture of digital sharing. This feedback loop is made possible by the participatory culture, the fact that the protest form is a fun “sport,” and the images of protesters spreading the notion of the protest form itself. Essentially one can argue that the protest methods pioneered by Project Chanology, born of an online culture, are ideally situated to take advantage of the emerging forms of social interaction made possible by online communications technologies.

4.3.3 The Need for New Forms

The methodologies of resistance that defined earlier eras (such as picket lines, moralizing protest and anger) have arguably become too stale, and “too serious.” In contemporary society, serious protest carries several risks which protest forms such as those used by Chanology may help to avoid. First, oblique humor may be the only useful response to absurd claims and powerful trolllike antagonists. To directly address opponents such as the Westboro Baptist Church may well imply tacit granting of general legitimacy that the antagonists do not warrant. To participate may be seen as an implicit acceptance of the grounds of engagement. Dadaist, absurd humor transcends the rules of engagement and has the potential to undercut the general legitimacy of the antagonistic group. Second, anger and direct confrontation can lead to conflict, violence and problems with the law. Rising to the bait may well be the response troll-like organizations are actively cultivating with their own extreme statements. Similarly, extreme behavior by fringe groups (like the ‘anarchists’ during the Seattle WTO protests) can be used to denigrate the peaceful efforts of the protester majority. It is hard to call people terrorists if they are handing out cake, carrying nonsensical signs and dancing to silly songs. For those struggling against repressive regimes, nonviolent, playful resistance can make it far more difficult for the State to engage in violent reprisals without provoking hostile responses from other political entities. Thus, we expect that the forms of protest utilized by Project Chanology are likely to continue to diffuse due to their utility in addressing many of the difficulties traditionally experienced by social movements.

5. CONCLUSION

What makes Chanology so compelling is ultimately not why they protest, but rather how they protest. The combination of culture, memetic information, humor, and real world activism defied both reprisal from the Church of Scientology and the typical modes of activism employed by social movements. Chanology provides an exciting new model of social movement organization as well as a fascinating fusion of online and offline cultures. The skillful integration of online communications technologies and the memetic grounding of Chanology have made it particularly well suited to a world in which the divisions between online and offline are increasingly ephemeral. The ability of Anonymous to successfully engage in action against a much more powerful organization in the Church of Scientology while managing to remain anonymous and avoid retaliation should be of great interest to those concerned with the ability of disempowered groups to mount meaningful resistance against more powerful groups.

As recent events such as the ongoing popular uprising in Iran or the unprecedented leak of over 10,000 US military documents facilitated by the site Wikileaks demonstrate, online communications technologies can present profound challenges to existing power structures. Public debate regarding the future of these technologies is well underway and so it is of the utmost importance for us as researchers to investigate phenomena such as Project Chanology so that we may increase understanding of how these technologies may impact us and how we can make decisions regarding their use so as to ensure that they live up to their potential for enabling more open, democratic societies. This further demonstrates the potential value of online communications technologies further penetrating less developed nations. Whether the methodologies of resistance employed in Project Chanology continue to proliferate or fade away as an aberration may depend heavily upon the decisions we make today.

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[4] Baram, M. (2008). Scientology's anonymous critics: Who are they? Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ABC News Online: http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=4513883&page=1 .
[5] Barkham, P. (2008). Hackers declare war on Scientologists amid claims of heavy-handed Cruise control: Actor's video clip forced off YouTube, say activists: Church hit by
sabotage of website and day of protest. The Guardian (London), p. 3.
[6] Baym, N. (2010). Personal Connections in the Digital Age. Boston, MA: Polity.
[7] Bellini, C. G., & Vargas, L. M. (2003). Rationale for internet-mediated communities. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 6(1), 3-14.
[8] Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[9] Burke, P. and J.Reitzes. (1991). “An Identity Theory Approach to Commitment.” Social Science Quarterly 54 (3): 239-251.
[10] Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural equivalence. American Journal of Sociology, 92, 6),1287–1335.
[11] Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural Holes and Good Ideas. Am. J. Sociology 110, 349
[12] Chwe, M. S.-Y. (2000). Communication and coordination in social networks. Review of Economic Studies, 67, 1-16.
[13] Clarkson, B. (2008). 200 cruise by Scientology HQ; Younge St. demonstration part of global protest. The Toronto Sun, p. 6.
[14] Constant, Sproull, Keisler. (1996). “The Kindness of Strangers: Usefulness of Electronic Weak Ties for Technical Advice.” Organization Science 7(2): 199-135.
[15] Dawes, Robyn M., et al . (1986). "Organizing Groups for Collective Action." The American Political Science Review 80 (4):1171-1185.
[16] Dawkins, R. (1990). The Selfish Gene, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press
[17] Diani, M. (2000). "Social Movement Networks Virtual and Real." Information, Communication & Society 3 (3):386.
[18] DiMaggio, P., E. Hargittai, W. R. Neuman, and J. P. Robinson. (2001). “Social Implication of the Internet. Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 307-36.
[19] Gleave, E., H. T. Welser, T. M. Lento, and M. A. Smith. (2009). “A Conceptual and Operational Definition of ‘Social Role’ in Online Community.” Proceedings of the 42nd
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences: 1-11.
[20] Irriberri, A., & Leroy, G. (2009). A life cycle perspective on online community success. ACM Computer Surveys, 41(2), 1-29.
[21] Lasar, D., A. Pentland, L. Adamic, S. Aral, A. Barabási, D. Brewer, N. Christakis, N. Contractor, J. Fowler, M. Gutmann, T. Jebara, G. King, M. Macy, D. Roy, M. Van Alstyne. 2009. “Computational Social Science.” Science Magazine 323 (5915) 721-723.
[22] Lento, T., H. T. Welser, L. Gu, and M. Smith. 2006. “The Ties that Blog: Examining the Relationship between Social Ties and Continued Participation in the Wallop Weblogging System” WWW Third Annual Workshop on the Weblogging Ecosystem, Edinburgh, Ireland.
[23] McAdam, D. and R. Paulsen. (1993). Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism. American Journal of Sociology 99(3): 640-667.
[24] Papacharissi, Z. (2009). "The Virtual Geographies of Social Networks: A Comparative Analysis of Facebook, LinkedIn and ASmallWorld." New Media & Society 11 (1-2):199-220.
[25] Perrotta, C. (2006). Learning to be a psychologist: the construction of identity in an online forum. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 22, 456-466.
[26] Pichardo, Nelson A. (1997). “New Social Movements: A Critical Review.” Annual Review of Sociology 23: 411-30.
[27] Pickerill, J. (2001). Environmental internet activism in Britain. Peace Review, 13(3), 365-370.
[28] Polletta, Francesca and James Jasper. (2001). “Collective Identity in Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology. 27: 283-305.
[29] Purcell, K. (2010, March 23). Teens and the internet: The future of digital diversity. Pew internet & American Life Project.
[30] Resnik, P., R. Zeckhauser, E. Friedman, and K. Kuwabara. (2000). “Reputation Systems.” Communication of the ACM. 43(12).
[31] Rheingold, H.. (2002). Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. New York: Basic Books.
[32] Rogers, E. M., & Kincaid, D. L. (1981). Communication networks: Toward a new paradigm for research. New York, NY: Free Press.
[33] Rolfe, B. (2005). Building an electronic repertoire of contention. Social Movement Studies, 4(1), 65-74.
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[35] Shirky, C. (2010). Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age. New York: The Penguin Press.
[36] Simmel, G. (1971). “The Metropolis and Mental Life”. Pp. 43-69 in On Individuality and Social Forms printed in the United States: University of Chicago Press.
[37] Simon B, Stürmer S, Loewy M, et al. (1988). “Collective Identification and Social Movement Participation.” Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 74(3):646-658.
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[39] Taylor, V. and N. Van Dyke. (2004). “‘Get up, Stand up’: Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements” in The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements. Edited by David Snow, Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Wiley Blackwell.
[40] Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements: 1768-2004. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, LLC.
[41] Williamson, O. E. 1981. “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach.” The American Journal of Sociology 87(3): 548-557.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Sirs Underwood & Welster, count me in!

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

The utility of Chwe’s network analytical approach to the problems of coordination in social movements is also demonstrated.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

tl;dr

Sponge · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I liked it but I also wanted some whywefail critical analysis in there too. I suppose that's a tall order what with chanology being so perfectly awesome and all .

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386485 said:

tl;dr

5. CONCLUSION

snip: What makes Chanology so compelling is ultimately not why they protest, but rather how they protest. The combination of culture, memetic information, humor, and real world activism defied both reprisal from the Church of Scientology and the typical modes of activism employed by social movements. Chanology provides an exciting new model of social movement organization as well as a fascinating fusion of online and offline cultures. /snip

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Those asking questions were often greeted with cries of “lurk more,” a phrase which refers to remaining in the background and observing without actively participating.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I read it.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

This is a highly detailed,well researched empirical study.
Do you think they watched me fap?

WillyWonkanon · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

@

DarkSpecterAnon · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

And nothing of value was ..... ?gained? ???

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

This is a highly detailed,well researched empirical study.
Do you think they watched me fap?

they are always watching us fap.

mirele · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Paper is mistitled. Should be, "'OH FUCK: The Internet is Here': Emergent Coordination and Innovation of Protest Forms in Digital Culture".

The meme means nothing without the OH FUCK part.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386488 said:

5. CONCLUSION

snip: What makes Chanology so compelling is ultimately not why they protest, but rather how they protest. The combination of culture, memetic information, humor, and real world activism defied both reprisal from the Church of Scientology and the typical modes of activism employed by social movements. Chanology provides an exciting new model of social movement organization as well as a fascinating fusion of online and offline cultures. /snip

And we dance and have caek!

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386518 said:

they are always watching us fap.

They like to watch.

Anonymous · Dec 31, 2010

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

hey, internet here,

i did not approve this post.
i am currently suing OP for slander and emotional distress plus +10 internets he stole from me and gave to trolls. i am currently consulting my jew lawyer to take his internets plus 401k

Saberthrower · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Wow. Nice study. I can't wait to see the movie version.

EDIT: Can anyone in Seattle go and tape the session? I really am interested in seeing this, but I am not at Seattle.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

itsbeautiful.jpg

Seriously, that write-up is a keeper.

Orson · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386485 said:

tl;dr

First, this is well worth your time to read.

Second, serious conference is serious. Grade A prime Academia stuff. Presenting sponsors include the National Science Foundation (NSF), Microsoft Research and others with support from Google.
More here: iConference 2011 Committees

It is not a purely technical conference.

About the iSchools

The study of information focuses on the intersection of information, technology, and people, which requires a broad interdisciplinary approach to those phenomena, the relationship between them, and their relationships to other aspects of culture and human endeavor. The ubiquity of information in human endeavor requires that the field of information aims to have an impact on all fields of science and all aspects of culture.

Saberthrower;1386620 said:

EDIT: Can anyone in Seattle go and tape the session? I really am interested in seeing this, but I am not at Seattle.

Looks like you could seriously get your geek on at this conference. For those interested, the fee is $400 in advance or $200 for a single day pass. More information here: iConference 2011 Registration

Given the nature of the study (and of course, since the authors blatantly state it), methinks someone involved in it has been lurking around here for a while. To that person I say, sup smartfag?

Ann O'Nymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Interesting - at least what I read so far. Some minor mistakes, like this one:

4.1.4 From Online to Offline

[...] One of the most commonly observed instances of this was participants referring to their protests as “raids,” which was the same label that Anonymous had previously used for attacks against online targets.

AFAIR "raids" was rarely used at first and became popular only in the Fall of 2008.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Ann O'Nymous;1386645 said:

Interesting - at least what I read so far. Some minor mistakes, like this one:

AFAIR "raids" was rarely used at first and became popular only in the Fall of 2008.

Or not. Google search on "raid Scientology" doesn't support your memory. Use of the term actually declined in the Fall of 2008.

Google time line search for "raid Scientology"

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Insightful paper is insightful.

But seriously this is the best academic paper on chanology I have ever seen.
The authors get it, they really get it. Probably get it better than many people here.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I don’t like the paper and I think they have made a few crucial errors.

1. Analysing the protests independently of the protest target is fail.

I’m not necessarily referring to morаlfaggotry here, but failing to take into the nature of the CoS as a source of abuse, its status as a long term foe of the internet, the sheer audaciousness of the troll it embodies, its lulzcow nature, etc. means that the paper completely misses much of the important nuance of what makes chanology what it is.

Here is an example to illustrate this failure. When discussing the lack of connection between members the paper has gotten the causation backwards here when it notes: “This later advantage proved to be particularly useful against the Church of Scientology which had historically sought to stifle criticism by identifying critics and engaging them in costly legal battles”. Anyone who was about in early 2008 will remember the role of anonymity as a protection being heavily discussed, and indeed many of the resulting protest norms we now have resulted from such discussion (the code of conduct for example).

This reversed causality bodes a much deeper problem for the paper’s thesis when it is noted that many of the tactics employed by chanology were derived from CoS’s earlier internet wars. By learning from the past, particularly how the CoS targeted OGs, many of the CoS-proof tactics of chanology were developed. The paper, by essentially concluding that such tactics were advantageous through fortune, misses a large swatch of how chanology developed. While the paper notes the highly adaptable nature of chanology, it fails to account the mechanisms by which that adaptability arose by neglecting the target of that adaptation.

Non-internet-specific aspects of CoS are also relevant, and the paper also ignores these. Many of the participants in chanology were highly knowledgeable of either the CoS or general cultism prior to the protests. In my own cell, to take an example, the majority of participants either have cult experience (whether personally or with relatives) or were significantly more informed regarding cultism than the average person. In a culture where personal qualities do not seem to be uniting factors, this does seem to stand out as a heavy contributor to participation. Lᵁlzfaggotry certainly played a part for many people, but without this underlying basis even lᵁlzfaggotry would not have been enough.

2. The paper’s analysis appears to rest on the incorrect assumption of ideological homogeneity.

In its analysis the paper makes the mistake of assuming the ideological expressions of certain participants can be successfully generalised. A particularly egregious example of this is “Reflecting this ethos, one participant urged others to join in by saying “If we can destroy Scientology, we can destroy whatever we like. The world will be but our plaything.” The reason I call this egregious is because of the irony that this paper tries to find points of group solidarity while ignoring the single obvious uniting factor – namely the CoS itself as discussed above.

The problem can be most clearly seen in the section discussion chanology’s origins. The paper writes:
“ Early participants in project Chanology were intensely involved in online communities hosted at 4chan. Amongst other functions, this site was both the source of many internet memes, and a figurative trophy case for 4channers who prided themselves on their capacity and success at trolling, intimidating, and harassing others. Though hardly a noble qualification, 4channers, and by extension Chanologists, were battle hardened veterans of online warfare and masters of the dark art of trolling. Like gangsters turned cops, those participating in Chanology harnessed that creativity and knowledge, channeling it into a successful movement strategy.”

While there were certainly channers who continued their participation as chanology transitioned from its 4chan origins, by ignoring the influx of non-channer participants the paper misses a crucial point. The influx of new personnel brought both new focus and new ideas, and resulted in chanology moving to areas beyond the vision of its founding channers. By ignoring this the paper incorrectly concludes that the ‘out-flanking’ of the CoS was solely grounded in the 4chan trolling culture. This is grossly inaccurate, and is the type of mistake the paper makes by incorrectly assuming ideological comments can be extrapolated to reflect the group (and even assuming a ‘group’ is dubious).

tl;dr:

Chanology began as 4chan fucking with the CoS. It grew and developed from that into what chanology is today. A substantial guiding force in that development was in response to the nature of the CoS. Analysing chanology in any capacity without taking this into account misses a great deal. By doing so the paper is deriving explanations based on group dynamics that aren’t reflective of how chanology really operates.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386686 said:

Insightful paper is insightful.

But seriously this is the best academic paper on chanology I have ever seen.
The authors get it, they really get it. Probably get it better than many people here.

Agreed. It would be really great to see their presentation. Wonder if someone local could inquire about access to record it for the net, or if the authors could be encouraged to do so themselves.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386687 said:

I don’t like the paper and I think they have made a few crucial errors.

1. Analysing the protests independently of the protest target is fail.

I’m not necessarily referring to morаlfaggotry here, but failing to take into the nature of the CoS as a source of abuse, its status as a long term foe of the internet, the sheer audaciousness of the troll it embodies, its lulzcow nature, etc. means that the paper completely misses much of the important nuance of what makes chanology what it is.

Here is an example to illustrate this failure. When discussing the lack of connection between members the paper has gotten the causation backwards here when it notes: “This later advantage proved to be particularly useful against the Church of Scientology which had historically sought to stifle criticism by identifying critics and engaging them in costly legal battles”. Anyone who was about in early 2008 will remember the role of anonymity as a protection being heavily discussed, and indeed many of the resulting protest norms we now have resulted from such discussion (the code of conduct for example).

This reversed causality bodes a much deeper problem for the paper’s thesis when it is noted that many of the tactics employed by chanology were derived from CoS’s earlier internet wars. By learning from the past, particularly how the CoS targeted OGs, many of the CoS-proof tactics of chanology were developed. The paper, by essentially concluding that such tactics were advantageous through fortune, misses a large swatch of how chanology developed. While the paper notes the highly adaptable nature of chanology, it fails to account the mechanisms by which that adaptability arose by neglecting the target of that adaptation.

Non-internet-specific aspects of CoS are also relevant, and the paper also ignores these. Many of the participants in chanology were highly knowledgeable of either the CoS or general cultism prior to the protests. In my own cell, to take an example, the majority of participants either have cult experience (whether personally or with relatives) or were significantly more informed regarding cultism than the average person. In a culture where personal qualities do not seem to be uniting factors, this does seem to stand out as a heavy contributor to participation. Lᵁlzfaggotry certainly played a part for many people, but without this underlying basis even lᵁlzfaggotry would not have been enough.

2. The paper’s analysis appears to rest on the incorrect assumption of ideological homogeneity.

In its analysis the paper makes the mistake of assuming the ideological expressions of certain participants can be successfully generalised. A particularly egregious example of this is “Reflecting this ethos, one participant urged others to join in by saying “If we can destroy Scientology, we can destroy whatever we like. The world will be but our plaything.” The reason I call this egregious is because of the irony that this paper tries to find points of group solidarity while ignoring the single obvious uniting factor – namely the CoS itself as discussed above.

The problem can be most clearly seen in the section discussion chanology’s origins. The paper writes:
“ Early participants in project Chanology were intensely involved in online communities hosted at 4chan. Amongst other functions, this site was both the source of many internet memes, and a figurative trophy case for 4channers who prided themselves on their capacity and success at trolling, intimidating, and harassing others. Though hardly a noble qualification, 4channers, and by extension Chanologists, were battle hardened veterans of online warfare and masters of the dark art of trolling. Like gangsters turned cops, those participating in Chanology harnessed that creativity and knowledge, channeling it into a successful movement strategy.”

While there were certainly channers who continued their participation as chanology transitioned from its 4chan origins, by ignoring the influx of non-channer participants the paper misses a crucial point. The influx of new personnel brought both new focus and new ideas, and resulted in chanology moving to areas beyond the vision of its founding channers. By ignoring this the paper incorrectly concludes that the ‘out-flanking’ of the CoS was solely grounded in the 4chan trolling culture. This is grossly inaccurate, and is the type of mistake the paper makes by incorrectly assuming ideological comments can be extrapolated to reflect the group (and even assuming a ‘group’ is dubious).

tl;dr:

Chanology began as 4chan fucking with the CoS. It grew and developed from that into what chanology is today. A substantial guiding force in that development was in response to the nature of the CoS. Analysing chanology in any capacity without taking this into account misses a great deal. By doing so the paper is deriving explanations based on group dynamics that aren’t reflective of how chanology really operates.

Are you one of the paper's authors?

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386687 said:

tl;dr:

[STRIKE]Chanology began as 4chan fucking with the CoS. It grew and developed from that into what chanology is today. A substantial guiding force in that development was in response to the nature of the CoS. Analysing chanology in any capacity without taking this into account misses a great deal. By doing so the paper is deriving explanations based on group dynamics that aren’t reflective of how chanology really operates.[/STRIKE]

tl;dr:
my chanology is mine.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386687 said:

I don’t like the paper and I think they have made a few crucial errors.

I like the paper and I think the authors have a better idea of how it works than most.

Many of the participants in chanology were highly knowledgeable of either the CoS or general cultism prior to the protests. In my own cell, to take an example, the majority of participants either have cult experience (whether personally or with relatives) or were significantly more informed regarding cultism than the average person.

I'd say your cell is rather unique in this respect - is it mostly OG?

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386687 said:

I don’t like the paper and I think they have made a few crucial errors.

1. Analysing the protests independently of the protest target is fail.

I’m not necessarily referring to morаlfaggotry here, but failing to take into the nature of the CoS as a source of abuse, its status as a long term foe of the internet, the sheer audaciousness of the troll it embodies, its lulzcow nature, etc. means that the paper completely misses much of the important nuance of what makes chanology what it is.

A few points for consideration.

1. Although written by sociologists, the audience for this piece is the IT crowd. What you're looking for has been well covered by Coleman and Dibbel (separately).

Anonymous;1386687 said:

Here is an example to illustrate this failure. When discussing the lack of connection between members the paper has gotten the causation backwards here when it notes: “This later advantage proved to be particularly useful against the Church of Scientology which had historically sought to stifle criticism by identifying critics and engaging them in costly legal battles”. Anyone who was about in early 2008 will remember the role of anonymity as a protection being heavily discussed, and indeed many of the resulting protest norms we now have resulted from such discussion (the code of conduct for example).

This reversed causality bodes a much deeper problem for the paper’s thesis when it is noted that many of the tactics employed by chanology were derived from CoS’s earlier internet wars. By learning from the past, particularly how the CoS targeted OGs, many of the CoS-proof tactics of chanology were developed. The paper, by essentially concluding that such tactics were advantageous through fortune, misses a large swatch of how chanology developed. While the paper notes the highly adaptable nature of chanology, it fails to account the mechanisms by which that adaptability arose by neglecting the target of that adaptation.

2. I was here in early 2008. The paper, entitled, "‘The Internet is Here’: Emergent Coordination and Innovation of Protest Forms in Digital Culture" is focusing on the unique interactions and social movement that are made capable by digital culture, etc.

With specific regard to Chanology, the technological capacity for what was being done, the techniques used and the methods employed existed as a result of straight trolling and had nothing to do with the target Scientology. The methods were there. Given Scientology's history of harassment and retribution, anon was the perfect nemesis to take on the cult.

That inherent norm of anonymity enabled IRL protests as well. Information on the behavior and history of the cult was of course used to make adustments, as it would be for any target.

Anonymous;1386687 said:

Non-internet-specific aspects of CoS are also relevant, and the paper also ignores these. Many of the participants in chanology were highly knowledgeable of either the CoS or general cultism prior to the protests. In my own cell, to take an example, the majority of participants either have cult experience (whether personally or with relatives) or were significantly more informed regarding cultism than the average person. In a culture where personal qualities do not seem to be uniting factors, this does seem to stand out as a heavy contributor to participation. Lᵁlzfaggotry certainly played a part for many people, but without this underlying basis even lᵁlzfaggotry would not have been enough.

I think your experience is unique. Plus note, the authors note that the methods employed were used to recruit others. Hello, others.

Of course, you get homogenized into the whole pretty quickly, especially back then. Also, you underestimate the power of lulz at your peril.

Anonymous;1386687 said:

2. The paper’s analysis appears to rest on the incorrect assumption of ideological homogeneity.

In its analysis the paper makes the mistake of assuming the ideological expressions of certain participants can be successfully generalised. A particularly egregious example of this is “Reflecting this ethos, one participant urged others to join in by saying “If we can destroy Scientology, we can destroy whatever we like. The world will be but our plaything.” The reason I call this egregious is because of the irony that this paper tries to find points of group solidarity while ignoring the single obvious uniting factor – namely the CoS itself as discussed above.

The problem can be most clearly seen in the section discussion chanology’s origins. The paper writes:
“ Early participants in project Chanology were intensely involved in online communities hosted at 4chan. Amongst other functions, this site was both the source of many internet memes, and a figurative trophy case for 4channers who prided themselves on their capacity and success at trolling, intimidating, and harassing others. Though hardly a noble qualification, 4channers, and by extension Chanologists, were battle hardened veterans of online warfare and masters of the dark art of trolling. Like gangsters turned cops, those participating in Chanology harnessed that creativity and knowledge, channeling it into a successful movement strategy.”

While there were certainly channers who continued their participation as chanology transitioned from its 4chan origins, by ignoring the influx of non-channer participants the paper misses a crucial point. The influx of new personnel brought both new focus and new ideas, and resulted in chanology moving to areas beyond the vision of its founding channers. By ignoring this the paper incorrectly concludes that the ‘out-flanking’ of the CoS was solely grounded in the 4chan trolling culture. This is grossly inaccurate, and is the type of mistake the paper makes by incorrectly assuming ideological comments can be extrapolated to reflect the group (and even assuming a ‘group’ is dubious).

tl;dr:

Chanology began as 4chan fucking with the CoS. It grew and developed from that into what chanology is today. A substantial guiding force in that development was in response to the nature of the CoS. Analysing chanology in any capacity without taking this into account misses a great deal. By doing so the paper is deriving explanations based on group dynamics that aren’t reflective of how chanology really operates.

I've run out of energy and time. So, suffice to say I think my earlier points touch on all of this. You're missing the context of the paper mostly and looking for things that have been covered by other academics. Plus, pay closer attention to words like "initially" and "early" in the paper.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386701 said:

… I think the authors have a better idea of how it works than most.

I agree, and this would seem to be due to the empiricism they employed. I just don’t think their data supports some of their conclusions though, particularly their attributed causality.

I'd say your cell is rather unique in this respect - is it mostly OG?

Only one regular could be labelled OG as that person had protested before chanology. The regular ex’s we have never protested prior to chanology, and one of those ex’s only left after chanology began. We do seem to lean much more towards the morаlfaggotry end of the scale compared to other cells though.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386714 said:

With specific regard to Chanology, the technological capacity for what was being done, the techniques used and the methods employed existed as a result of straight trolling and had nothing to do with the target Scientology. The methods were there. Given Scientology's history of harassment and retribution, anon was the perfect nemesis to take on the cult.

My response to this would be to ask what other target group do you think could have inspired a chanology-like movement? I can’t think of any, which makes me question the development of such a movement without a Scientology-like target. While I would agree the potential for those techniques was already there, I would argue that without the proper target to act as a focus the development of such techniques would not have happened. In other words, while you are correct to state that anonymous was perfect for tackling Scientology I would argue it is equally important to note that Scientology was perfect for drawing chanology out of its originating culture.

Information on the behavior and history of the cult was of course used to make adustments, as it would be for any target.

It appears we disagree as to how much or a role such adjustments played, with me arguing for a much larger role than yourself.

I think your experience is unique.

I am willing to concede this point.

You're missing the context of the paper mostly and looking for things that have been covered by other academics.

As I noted, the paper attempts to attribute various qualities of chanology to various factors. I think it is folly to ignore imo the most relevant factor to try propping up other factors, especially of those are of a theoretical nature.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386725 said:

My response to this would be to ask what other target group do you think could have inspired a chanology-like movement? I can’t think of any, which makes me question the development of such a movement without a Scientology-like target. While I would agree the potential for those techniques was already there, I would argue that without the proper target to act as a focus the development of such techniques would not have happened. In other words, while you are correct to state that anonymous was perfect for tackling Scientology I would argue it is equally important to note that Scientology was perfect for drawing chanology out of its originating culture.

In order bolded above:
1. Hmmm, Operation Payback and wikileaks comes to mind
2. lern2anonhistory......dare I say, lurk moar.
3. Welcome to Why We Protest

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I also cannot think of targets that go out of their way to the extent Scientology does to create their own enemies.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386540 said:

They like to watch.

lol!
<3

moarxenu · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386687 said:

I don’t like the paper and I think they have made a few crucial errors.

I welcome the paper because I think Chanology is a unique phenomenon completely deserving of academic interest. I think the critiques of the anon above are right on the money and have a few of my own to add.

My jumping off point is this from the Conclusion:

Chanology provides an exciting new model of social movement organization as well as a fascinating fusion of online and offline cultures.

I find it difficult to believe that Chanology could be adopted as a model by any of four signficant contemporary protest movents: the anti-war, anti-Global Warming, Free Tibet, and (pace lefties and inb4racistmorons) the Tea Party movement.

In addition to failing to take into account the nature of our failfag cult enemy, the analysis neglects the inherent artistic creativity of channer culture and that fact that Chanology is entirely the creation of millennials since 80% of Anonymous is under the age of 35.

The origin of Anonymous culture is the decision of a 15-year-old animé fan (moot) to create the first English image board. Rapidly anons became not only users of art but constant creators of art. There is not only the art of shoops, macros, vids, and memes, but also of rhetoric of which the Jewtube declaration of war of January 21, 2008 is an outstanding example followed by megaphonebitch's transformation of MLK's "I have a dream speech" in The State of the Insurgency address. There is also the art of trolling, and particularly relevant, the art of raiding.

The choice of the little niggra avatar for raiding Habbo was an esthetic choice of the first importance, and self-organizing a well-formed swastiget amid chaos is the height of operational elegance.

Likewise, our choice of the Guy Fawkes mask was an aesthetic choice of genius. It manifested our connection to an anti-totalitarian hero in our culture and gave the broader anti-Scientology movement what it lacked for sixty years - a striking, readily identifiable symbol.

Millennial anons were not only born into the technological arts of the internets but into Pokémon, animé, graphic novels, cyberpunk, sci-fi, movies, and gaming, where artistic visuals are as important as technological awesomeness. No other protest movement has this depth of aesthetic richness and creativity. They are srsly malnourished in memes and lulz.

Here are a few other cultural things I found off the mark:

Dadaist, absurd humor transcends the rules of engagement and has the potential to undercut the general legitimacy of the antagonistic group.

Our humor is not at all aburd if you understand our culture. I have heard the wrong-head Dadaist description several times.

Dada was created by 13year-old basement dwellers to troll the tight-ass bourgeoisie of Switzerland, the homeland of our own Ann O'Nonymous. That was over 100 years ago and now Dada is as dead as teh Dodo. But they made cool art and would have made great shoopers.

Memes as inside jokes: To have an inside joke you need to have firm barriers against outsiders, which do not exist either at 4chan or Chanology because they are completely public. Anonymity allows for the widest participation without regard to creed, color, race, age, or political or relgious self-identification. It is a cultural Marxist PC-tard's wet dream, except of course we loath PC faggotry.

It is remarkable that Anon culture has concommitently defined its language and linguistic memes at Urban Dictionary and the Institute of Internets Studies and Meme-ology to make the culture even moar understandable and available to the public.

More remarkably it has continued to record its history in real time and with dox at Encyclopedia Dramatica. It is the only place where the chronology of Project Chanology is easily found, and where you can learn, for example, that the DDoS attacks on the evil cult in January 2008 lasted precisely all of thirteen days, from the "It's time for /b/ to do something big" thread on 4chan on January 15, to Wise Beard Man's vid on January 28.

It also records the drama of the summer of 2008 which nearly destroyed Chanology. (I skipped all that. As a Hamburg fag said, "We don't give a shit about server drama." It's good to have ED to find out what went on.)

[W]e should expect that culture, in terms of practices, values, and sensibilities that emerge in one context, may well be carried into new social terrain.

I can't see this happening with the four protest movements I have cited. The supreme value of Anon is near-absolute "anything goes but CP" devotion to free speech. Troll an anti-war or teabagger protest or zee Chinese Commies and see how devoted they are to free speech.

I found much of the discussion about decentralization, flexible group structures etc. insightful. I lol'd at the Table 1 "pc=>.9000" statistical analysis. They are academic sociologists and so they have to put this shit in or the paper wouldn't be published.

Measuring degrees of interconnectedness by messages on the user pages of a Wiki (perhaps the lamentably defunct /i/nsurgency wiki ) is srsly defective. Everyone knows that srs bzns is carried on by IRC, texting, and sekrit tree forts.

What makes Chanology so compelling is ultimately not why they protest, but rather how they protest.

Compelling to whom? Academics, the public, or us? What we protest and how we protest are as inseparable as the dancer from the dance.

One of the most uncanny things about Chanology is that hivemind intuited just the right target at just the right time. None of the big human rights organizations gave a shit about the cult's suppression of free speech and abusive treatment of its members and their families.

Anon picked an organization whose dismantling was quite doable, unlike the Chicom government or the weather. And of course the cult is the biggest lulzcow around and everyone has hated it for years.

Anti-war fags, Free Tibet emos, AGW hysterics, and teabaggers still be hatin', meanwhile Chanology has won because We Run This.

Still, it is good to have academics to start thinking and writing about Chanology. Even moar interesting than how Chanology succeeded is how it has avoided anheroing.

So welcome academic newfags, and carry on.

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386730 said:

In order bolded above:
1. Hmmm, Operation Payback and wikileaks comes to mind
2. lern2anonhistory......dare I say, lurk moar.
3. Welcome to Why We Protest

Would operation payback, specifically the elements that mimic chanology past the DDOS stage, have developed without chanology as a template? I think the answer is no and serves to support the point I was making. I note the lack of substantive examples for 2 and 3.

Anonymous;1386737 said:

I also cannot think of targets that go out of their way to the extent Scientology does to create their own enemies.

A good point that is worth quoting.

moarxenu;1386787 said:

What we protest and how we protest are as inseparable as the dancer from the dance.

You managed to sum up in one sentence what I tried to in a tl;dr.

Rockyj · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Project Chanology represents in interesting instance in which identity commitment appears to be centered on having fun and the image of the self as trickster.

My tribe mostly recognizes "Spliyay" (Coyote) as the trickster & other tribes it the trickster could be could be Crow, Raven, or other animal or bird.

In the Native American oral tradition, the vulgar but sacred Trickster assumes many forms. He can be Old-Man Coyote among the Crow tribes, Raven in northwestern Indian lore, or, more generically, "The Tricky One" (such as Wakdjunkaga among the Winnebago or Manabozho among the Menomini), to mention just a few of his manifestations.

As will be suggested by the tales below, Trickster alternately scandalizes, disgusts, amuses, disrupts, chastises, and humiliates (or is humiliated by) the animal-like proto-people of pre-history, yet he is also a creative force transforming their world, sometimes in bizarre and outrageous ways, with his instinctive energies and cunning. Eternally scavenging for food, he represents the most basic instincts, but in other narratives, he is also the father of the Indian people and a potent conductor of spiritual forces in the form of sacred dreams.

Native American Trickster Tales

All of the tales involving Coyote will usually make your jaw drop. From him losing his anus in a bet to letting Beaver sleep with his wife because he lost a bet hunting rabbits. Coyote will trick you into letting him babysit your children then he will eat them and run away. Many years ago I came across a magic book with a summoning inside to call Coyote. I read it many times for fun like a complete fool.

me like this^^^

Coyote Blues: The Native American Trickster - Panama City paranormal | Examiner.com

Jeff Jacobsen · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I've read "‘The Internet is Here’: Emergent Coordination and Innovation of Protest Forms in Digital Culture" by Patrick Underwood of the University of Washington and Howard T. Welser of Ohio University. Both are from the Sociology department from their respective schools.

This paper is similar to my own (article by Jeff Jacobsen on Project Chanology) in that it is an attempt to understand Project Chanology, an offshoot of the online group known as Anonymous. I am happy that others have taken up this important subject. However, I do have a few quibbles.

tl; dr -> the authors should have 1) told what the timeline was they were researching and 2) gone to protests. They didn't quite get the non-structural nature of Anonymous.

While the authors state that their research material was derived from Internet discusssions amongst Project Chanology participants (p. 2), they do not give a timeline for when these discussions took place. This is important because the beginnings of Project Chanology were chaotic and scattered, while today the actions of the movement have somewhat stabilized. It would have been nice as well for them to have named the sites they used for their research. I am a bit disheartened that they did not apparently choose to actually observe a protest as far as I can tell. At least they don't mention having done so. I assume they watched youtube videos of protests.

And now on to the article. I'll quote a piece and comment on it. I'll say here that I do not consider myself to be part of Anonymous. I do, however, participate in Project Chanology.

"Project Chanology represents in [sp] interesting instance in which identity commitment appears to be centered on having fun and the image of the self as trickster." (p. 2) Does every Anon consider him or herself a trickster? Trolling is a backbone of Anonymous, but I don't think everyone considers themselves to be a troll. Also, I don't think they considered that not all who participate in Project Chanology came from Anonymous. But this is a minor quibble.

"The centrality of skillful use of cultural capital also provided a cost of entry for newcomers. In order to be accepted as legitimate insiders, those new to Project Chanology had to spend time observing and learning the culture of Anonymous. Those asking questions were often greeted with cries of “lurk more,” a phrase which refers to remaining in the background and observing without actively participating. In essence it is a demand to learn more about the group and its actions before participating. It appears that this cost of entry also helped to strengthen bonds between insiders by enabling a shared sense of possession of somewhat rarefied cultural knowledge." (p. 4) Does PC really care if a participant is an "insider"? I mean, if you go protest, who cares if it's someone's grandmother who's never been on /b/ before. The whole idea of Anonymous is that an Anon could be anybody. So do they really need insider status? I'm confuse. Also, arguing is one of the social norms of Anonymous.

And here is where it might be good for the authors to have gone to protests. The discussions online assumed that the participant was at least up to speed with Anonymous and the basic ideas and goals of Project Chanology. If you tried to participate and showed a lack in these areas, you were told in typical blunt fashion to GTFO and come back when you knew what you were talking about. When the "Old Guard" - those people who had been protesting Scientology before Project Chanology - showed up online, there was intense debate on how or whether to interact with them. But at the protests (I went to every monthly protest for the first 2 years), nobody really cared who you were, it was just nice to have you there. If you had a funny sign or costume or chant, so much the better. If you brought cake, you were a god. But if you didn't know all the words to "Never Gonna Give You Up" nobody cared.

"By orienting their protests towards enactment of this culture, members of Anonymous participating in Chanology both reaffirmed their shared identity and signaled to other members of Anonymous that Chanology was something which fit within the normative boundaries of the broader collective." (p. 4) But this was a big issue. By going out to IRL (In Real Life) protests, it violated rules 1 and 2. Many anons were angry with this idea. It wasn't just moving Anonymous out to the streets This was a major shift. It was the first time Anonymous ever WENT into the streets. The "broader collective" was rattled by Project Chanology.

"We often observed individuals explicitly stating that they were drawn to Project Chanology mainly because the protesters they saw seemed to be having so much fun. Members often joked that Project Chanology was a 'social club for nerds.' We also observed individuals stating that they had never thought of themselves as prototypical social movement participants, but that the radically playful nature of Chanology was something with which they were immediately at ease." (p.4) I saw people at the first protest who were AFRAID! This was "serious business." Scientology's reputation of "attack the attacker" was known to most protesters, yet they still came out. Yes it was fun. But it was that Anons made serious business fun, NOT that they would go have fun and maybe indirectly succeed in some serious business. Again, it would be nice to know what time period the authors' observation involved.

"...those most active in Project Chanology tended to be the most isolated." (p. 5) Wut.

"Just as in Chwe’s models, the decision of individuals to participate in a given course of action within Chanology was highly contingent upon knowledge that others would engage in the same action. The fear of embarrassment and vulnerability to retaliation from the Church which small numbers entailed was commonly cited as a primary reason for hesitance to engage in the
protests." (p. 6) How does this explain the first protest, which was the 2nd biggest? NOBODY KNEW how many people would come out. The organizer in Denver told me he didn't know for sure if anybody was coming. These were mostly people who did not know each other, who didn't know the reliability of each other. The amazing part is that the first protest materialized from people who didn't know each other, and who didn't even know if they were the only Anons in their city or not. There was none of this wait-around-and-see-how-it-goes until later protests. But even then, the first two protests were so wildly successful that I would think most people would have lost their hesitancy.

The whole page 6 thing about cells just doesn't fit too well with the first protest. So I assume they're talking about subsequent protests? The idea that you get a direction from a central hub, then go back and convince your cell on the idea makes no sense to me. There's no reason to go explain something to a "cell" because anybody can see the original idea at the hub themselves. I mean, the hub-as-internet-discussion and cell-as-geographically-connected-anons works for me. But then to use that structure as the way decisions were spread is just wrong. Anonymous is essentially individual decision making.

"In Scientology, Chanologists had found an organization which behaved, in their eyes, according to the abusive, aggressive, antagonistic methods of trolling." (p. 6) You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIP6EwqMEoE&feature=related]YouTube - You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.[/ame]

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

I saw Batman. I liked the Joker.

Can I have my PhD now?

Anonymous · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Jeff Jacobsen;1386860 said:

"...those most active in Project Chanology tended to be the most isolated." (p. 5) Wut.

Author needs to lrn2sockpuppet.

Vexius · Jan 1, 2011

Re: ‘The Internet is Here’ - iConference 2011

Anonymous;1386863 said:

I saw Batman. I liked the Joker.

Can I have my PhD now?

i love you, will you birth my chilren?

i myself believe to be a form of "the joker" and/or a replica of his majesty.

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